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UKIP and the UK’s radical right: A tale of movement party success? 
Jeanne Hanna (American University, Washington, DC, USA) 
Joel Busher, (Coventry University, UK) 
 
Introduction 
Among the political upsets laid at the feet of right wing groups in recent years, the United 
Kingdom’s vote to exit the European Union (EU) in June 2016 was perhaps the most unexpected 
and among those with the most far-reaching implications. While the ‘Brexit’ vote was driven by 
a variety of actors (Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley 2017), few if any were as important as the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) who, over the twenty years preceding the referendum, had become 
one of the most forthright and prominent proponents of Euroscepticism in the UK and beyond 
(Ford & Goodwin 2014; Goodwin & Milazzo 2015). UKIP’s role as an impetus of the EU 
referendum and as active, grassroots campaigners for the Leave vote represent the group’s 
pinnacle triumph and the (at least partial) fulfilment of its founding purpose. Analysis of this 
victory, however, also throws light on the struggles of UKIP’s members to mobilize around other 
issues and reveals the disorder in UKIP’s ranks both before and since the referendum.  
 
In this chapter, we show how the concept of movement parties (Kitschelt 2006) provides a useful 
lens through which to surface and interpret the hybrid nature of political actors such as UKIP, 
and argue that UKIP’s role in British politics – as both a political party and, at times, as a 
constituent part of a wider movement – provides a salient case through which to understand the 
opportunities and perils that organising as a hybrid movement party might pose for actors on the 
right of the political spectrum.  In developing this argument, we also invite reflection on three 
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issues that require careful consideration if the concept of movement party is to help us to better 
comprehend right-wing politics at its more radical fringes. The first concerns the question of for 
which movement UKIP functions as a vehicle. As we describe below, while UKIP was founded 
as a result of particular political and constitutional concerns, over time it has been a vehicle for a 
range of different and at times competing movements with distinct and occasionally conflicting 
interests and ideas. This raises an intriguing possibility: is it possible that a movement party can 
serve simultaneously as a vehicle for the interests of more than one movement, or for a series of 
movements over time?    
 
The second issue concerns the non-linearity of UKIP’s organisational journey. Unlike the 
broadly left-wing groups that Kitschelt initially analysed as movement parties, which emerged 
initially as social movements and later adopted a more party-like form in order to operate in new 
arenas (2006, 281-2), UKIP has in practice wavered between functioning and organising as a 
party, a movement party and a movement throughout the past twenty-five years, sometimes 
functioning and organising simultaneously as all three – at times a source of considerable intra-
group tension. This raises important questions about whether such non-linearity might be typical 
of ‘movement parties’ on the right, and if so what implications it might have for how the concept 
is deployed.  
 
The third issue concerns the slipperiness of notions of organisational ‘success’, whether in the 
analyses of external actors (academics, journalists, other political parties, etc.) or internal actors 
(activists, leaders, members). Given that the success of political parties is usually assessed 
primarily in terms of numbers of votes and representatives, it is unsurprising that such measures 
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have been prominent in discussions about UKIP’s fortunes, particularly among external actors. 
Yet attention to internal actors’ perspectives reveals more hybrid and fluid notions of success. As 
discussed below, UKIP’s leaders have frequently focused more on moving the political debate 
and pressuring rival parties, rather than replacing them. At the same time, however, UKIP has 
always participated in, at a minimum, national elections, and when its polling numbers have been 
favourable, touted its success on those terms. Arguably, such diverse and flexible definitions of 
success have comprised an asset for UKIP, enabling leaders and activists alike to sustain 
movement morale and media attention by claiming victories or dismissing losses even when the 
facts on the ground appeared to suggest otherwise. Yet they have also provided a point of 
potential rupture as different definitions of success have revealed different and sometimes 
conflicting aims: something brought home most starkly in the fallout from the EU referendum. 
As one long-time UKIP member opined at a branch meeting in Rotherham, South Yorkshire, less 
than a year after the EU referendum, ‘In many ways we would have been better off if we just lost 
the referendum, rather than just won it.’ 
 
We explore these issues by tracing UKIP’s history across four periods: 1) from its founding in 
1993 to 2010, when UKIP operated largely as a fringe party; 2) from 2010 to 2015, when UKIP 
began to gain significant electoral support and eventually achieved the promise of an EU 
referendum; 3) the year-long referendum campaign and its impact on UKIP’s understanding of 
its own purpose; and 4) UKIP’s trajectory after the EU referendum and what it means for a 
movement party to potentially have its greatest accomplishment behind it. 
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The chapter draws on a combination of the academic literature regarding UKIP, media reporting, 
and primary ethnographic research, carried out among UKIP activists and supporters before, 
during, and after the UK’s referendum on EU membership in June 2016. Overt ethnographic 
observation was conducted by the lead author at over sixty UKIP meetings, campaigns, 
conferences, electoral events, and social gatherings, both formal and informal, across South 
Yorkshire between May 2015 and May 2017. Forty-five semi-structured interviews were carried 
out with UKIP activists, local party leaders, councillors, and activists working with anti-racist 
and anti-fascist organisations, as well as countless informal interviews and conversations with 
people connected directly or peripherally with UKIP. The fieldwork was undertaken with ethical 
approval from the American University in Washington, DC, the lead author’s host institution. 
 
1993 – 2010: Survival on the political fringe 
UKIP was founded as a political party in 1993 by Alan Sked, a London School of Economics 
historian, in response to the failure of the Anti-Federalist League, an earlier cross-party 
organisation also led by Sked, to gain significant support in their efforts to prevent the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. As has been well documented (most notably Ford & 
Goodwin 2014, 20-106) in its early years UKIP experienced more lows than highs, particularly 
in electoral terms. In its earliest election contests UKIP was outstripped at times even by the 
Monster Raving Loony Party, and while UKIP enjoyed notable success in the European 
Parliament (EP) elections of 2004 and 2009, coming third and second with 15.6% and 16% of 
the national vote respectively, such successes took a long time to arrive and did not translate into 
other electoral arenas. UKIP did not enjoy a significant breakthrough in local elections until 
2013 and had to wait until 2014 to win their first seat in the UK Parliament. Furthermore, these 
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victories were always swiftly followed by an eruption of internal divisions that threatened to pull 
the organisation apart (Ford & Goodwin 2014, 20-106). 
 
Indeed, the 2004 EP elections aside, it was only towards the end of 2008 that UKIP emerged 
clearly as the leading party committed to Euroscepticism in the UK.1  During the mid-1990s Sir 
James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, founded in 1994 to advocate for a nation-wide 
referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, was better funded than UKIP, able to field more 
candidates and more adept at garnering recognition with the press and public (Carter, Evans, 
Alderman & Gorham 1998). The Referendum Party collapsed after the death of Goldsmith in 
1997, leading many supporters to switch their allegiances to UKIP. This, along with a shift to 
proportional representation in EP elections as of 1999 and the fact that as a ‘second order 
election’ (Reif and Schmitt 1980) the EP elections favoured UKIP due to lower voter turnout and 
voters’ propensity to use such elections to evince dissatisfaction with the larger parties, all 
contributed to UKIP’s first relative electoral success, coming fourth and achieving three seats. 
From this point on EP elections would prove both an electoral and financial boon for UKIP due 
to the financial resources granted to UKIP by the EP as a function of their EP representatives – 
although as discussed below these resources would eventually also become a source of internal 
conflict. However, in local and national elections UKIP still found itself trailing the extreme 
right British National Party (BNP), which promoted a longstanding nativist and anti-immigrant 
platform and was also thoroughly hostile to the UK’s membership in the transnational EU. UKIP 
was beaten by the BNP in 80% of the constituencies in which both parties stood candidates in 
                                                 
1 While the Conservative Party has become increasingly dominated by Eurosceptic positions, particularly since 
William Hague’s leadership (1997-2001), it has never as a party been dedicated to Euroscepticism.   
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2005 and the BNP won two to three times as many votes as UKIP in a series of local elections 
between 2006 and 2008 (Ford and Goodwin 2014).  
 
So how did UKIP operate during this period? In some respects at least, in this period UKIP 
resembles most closely what Kitschelt describes as a movement party. As described above, 
UKIP emerged out of the conviction of Sked and colleagues that a fully-fledged political party 
was required to advance Eurosceptic positions that they believed were not represented by the 
main parties. Yet despite registering as a political party, analysis of UKIP’s policy platform, 
mode of organising and strategic aims make clear that it functioned throughout much of its early 
years essentially as a single-issue pressure group. 
 
As early as the 1997 General Election, UKIP’s policy platform begins to expand beyond 
withdrawal from the EU to include positions on healthcare, education, defence, and other policy 
areas. However, both the 1997 and 2001 manifestos were ultimately framed around the perceived 
financial and regulatory burdens of UK membership of the EU. Indeed, during elections through 
the early 2000s, UKIP’s leaders resisted internal pressure to further expand the party’s platform 
or emphasise issues beyond withdrawal from the EU. They instead encouraged supporters to use 
elections and election hustings to discuss the perils of the EU and focused their energies on 
pressuring mainstream parties to support EU withdrawal (Ford and Goodwin 2014). What 
broadening of their policy platform did take place appears largely to have been instrumental: 
driven by party leaders’ recognition of the difficulty of folding together tenuous support from a 
wide swath of British politics on the sole basis of shared antipathy to the EU (Lynch and 
Whitaker 2013). As discussed further below, there was an emerging view among party 
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leadership, particularly Nigel Farage, one of their first MEPs and a media savvy campaigner who 
would become one of their longest serving and, arguably, most successful leaders, that that they 
would only be able to compete with parties such as the BNP by expanding their policy base 
(Ford and Goodwin 2014: 89-92). 
 
During this period, UKIP’s mode of organising also resembled what Kitschelt describes as that 
of a movement party. While UKIP quickly developed a cohort of activists operating primarily at 
the national level, there was little investment in developing the type of party infrastructure, 
particularly at the local level, required to build lasting electoral support at all levels of 
representation. In fact, the contrast between their failure to do so and the BNP’s Liberal 
Democrat-inspired strategy of building local pockets of support through community politics 
(Copsey 2007; John and Margetts 2009; Goodwin 2011) is likely to be one of the reasons why 
the BNP, despite significant stigma, was able to outperform UKIP at local and national elections 
for as long as it did. 
 
Crucially, the narrow policy focus on opposition to the EU also shaped UKIP’s strategic aims 
during this period. While UKIP entered the electoral arena from the outset, electoral contests 
were seen primarily as an opportunity to fan pervasive anxieties over the EU and, later, the new 
Euro currency, driving this issue into greater public prominence. Even within electoral contexts 
their aim, at least initially, was not to replace the Conservative Party, itself internally divided on 
the issue of the EU, but to pressure more Conservative MPs into adopting Eurosceptic positions 
by undermining their ability to compete against other main party candidates (Ford and Goodwin 
2014: 32-38) – arguably a more realistic aim within the UK’s first-past-the-post system. During 
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UKIP’s first nationwide electoral campaigns they specifically targeted seats in the south of 
England held by pro-EU Conservative MPs, a strategy that remained largely unchanged over the 
next decade. 
 
By 2007 a new strategic direction appeared to be emerging. Party staffers, including Liverpool-
born future party leader Paul Nuttall, urged leaders to expand UKIP’s focus to Labour-leaning 
constituencies in the north of England (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 108-109). Heading Nuttall’s 
advice, in the run-up to the 2009 EP elections then-leader, Nigel Farage, committed to contesting 
every seat in the upcoming race, including those in working class constituencies in the Midlands 
and North of England where the BNP had previously been more successful at challenging 
Labour’s dominance in local elections (John and Margetts 2009). This strategic shift was not 
uncontroversial, particularly among UKIP’s more single-minded Eurosceptics. However, it was 
deemed successful when UKIP not only gained one further MEP, bringing the party’s total to 
thirteen, but also narrowly defeated the Labour Party to place second for the first time, securing 
more than twice as many votes as the BNP (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 76-78).  
 
Yet even after such spectacular electoral success, the single-issue focus of some within UKIP 
would soon shape party strategy again. Farage, to the surprise of many, resigned as leader after 
the 2009 EP elections. No sooner in post, the new incumbent, Lord Pearson, attempted to form 
an electoral alliance with the Conservatives for the upcoming 2010 general election (Ford and 
Goodwin 2014: 80-81). In a seemingly bizarre move as the leader of a political party, Pearson 
offered to disband UKIP entirely if David Cameron would pledge to hold a referendum on 
British membership of the EU as part of the Conservative Party’s election platform (Hough and 
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Prince 2009). Although the proposal was rejected, news of it undermined UKIP’s fledgling 
position as a genuine and independent political contender and reinforced public perception that 
UKIP was essentially a single-issue party. 
 
The events that followed help to illustrate how, even at this relatively early stage, UKIP had 
become a vehicle for different movements with sometimes competing interests and aspirations. 
Pearson’s offer of a deal with the Conservative Party made sense within a conceptualisation of 
UKIP as a single-issue protest group broadly aligned with the Eurosceptic wing of the 
Conservative Party and that defined success primarily in terms of UK withdrawal from the EU. 
Many of UKIP’s supporters and activists, however, had latched onto a wider set of political ideas 
and aspirations that were only realistically attainable if they could achieve a more direct role in 
policy and governance. As such, while Pearson was trying, and failing, to strike an electoral deal 
with the Conservative Party, another increasingly influential faction now favoured a more radical 
anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic agenda which, they believed, would appeal to disaffected 
working class voters in the Labour heartlands of deindustrializing northern towns (Ford and 
Goodwin 2014: 83-85). The result was one of the most wide-ranging manifestos published by 
UKIP to date. For the first time, UKIP’s campaign literature openly opposed ‘multiculturalism’ 
and referred to tackling ‘extremist Islam,’ implying that Islam was antithetical to ‘Britishness’ 
and advocated policies targeting Muslims, including bans on face veils, ‘radical preachers’ and 
‘sharia courts’ (UKIP 2010). This manifesto also contained statements challenging climate 
science and related policies as well as proposals to decentralize the NHS and implement an opt-
out voucher system for patients. Yet such radical proposals and language unnerved some of 
UKIP’s more moderate supporters.  
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UKIP went into the May 2010 election in a state of disarray. While Pearson continued to make 
open attempts to strike deals with Eurosceptic Conservative candidates, some UKIP candidates 
in Conservative constituencies who opposed such moves refused party orders to stand down 
against their Eurosceptic rivals (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 84-86). Yet even with such confusion, 
the electoral fruits of broadening their policy platform and expanding their ambitions were 
evident. While the total votes cast for UKIP dropped from almost 2.5 million in the EP election 
in 2009 to under one million in the 2010 General Election, something important had happened in 
terms of the distribution of their support: they had begun to make inroads in Labour heartlands in 
the North and Midlands (Ford and Goodwin 2010: (80-85). 
 
2010 – 2015: UKIP as a serious electoral challenger 
 
Two developments dominate this period: a drive to build local and national structures in order to 
professionalise UKIP as a political party; and the growing prominence of opposition to ‘mass 
immigration’ as a focus of policy attention.  
 
Recognising that UKIP could not compete meaningfully as a political party without developing 
its infrastructure, Farage, who reassumed leadership after the 2010 election, ensured that UKIP 
hired regional organizers and began to make substantial investments in local campaigning. In 
some respects the move was a resounding success. Party membership more than doubled 
between 2010 and 2013 – providing a significant increase both in human and financial resources 
– and UKIP made significant electoral gains at a series of local elections, becoming the official 
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opposition or even gaining control of several local authorities (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 92-93). 
Then in 2014, an ascendant UKIP won an historic victory over both the Labour and Conservative 
Parties in the EP elections with 26.6% of the vote.  
 
This formalization of party infrastructure could be read as a sign of UKIP’s transition from being 
a movement party to a fully-fledged political party. Yet in other ways UKIP continued to 
resemble a movement party. While UKIP developed local and national structures across the 
country, party leaders, including Farage, still did relatively little to meaningfully incorporate the 
new members within the party or to reconcile the different political interests and ideas driving 
UKIP support in different parts of the country and across different sections of the electorate. 
 
UKIP’s traditional support-base in the South of England was more middle class than their new 
supporters. They were concerned with lowering taxes and mitigating perceived economic ill-
effects of immigration. Many of UKIP’s new supporters in the North and Midlands, however, 
had more in common with the BNP’s traditional base (Ford et al. 2012; Cutts et al. 2011). They 
were more likely to have grown up in working class, Labour supporting families (Ford et al. 
2012) and their concerns about immigration, while not divorced from economic circumstances, 
were more frequently articulated in terms of cultural difference and integration (Ford and 
Goodwin 2014: 117-126). In South Yorkshire for example, where the fieldwork underpinning 
this study took place, UKIP supporters’ explanations of what had motivated them to join the 
party were often framed in terms of the supposed effects of immigrants on British culture. 
Furthermore, northern UKIP activists were typically more concerned about dwindling public 
safety nets, the closure of local care homes for elderly or disabled family members, the de-
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funding of home-based care services and the perceived vulnerabilities of the National Health 
Service (NHS) than they were about levels of taxation. 
 
The balancing of such different interests was never going to be easy, but was made more difficult 
by the fact that, whatever Farage’s intentions, the growth of UKIP’s party infrastructure neither 
kept pace with nor evolved to represent the growing diversity of interests and local realities in 
which activists were operating. Some grassroots members, particularly in the North, complained 
that the national leadership was ‘parachuting in’ organizers and candidates from other areas of 
the country, often one of the party’s growing list of MEPs, rather than recruiting and training 
local activists – a practice that many believed reflected a growing dominance of the party by its 
MEPs as a result of the EP funding they brought in.  
 
UKIP supporters in South Yorkshire also evinced frustration with the management style of the 
still largely southern-based party leadership, frequently citing the lack of adequate support for 
local council elections. Even while local leaders in Rotherham celebrated winning fourteen 
council seats in 2014, they simultaneously bemoaned the scant financial or logistical they 
received from party headquarters. Local supporters complained that when a senior party figure 
did come to Yorkshire to speak on behalf of UKIP’s national interests, the newcomer would 
inevitably commit a regionally-specific political faux pas, whether it was praising Margaret 
Thatcher, still much reviled in this former mining and industrial region, or proposing further cuts 
to social services, including the NHS, which many northern UKIP activists were committed to 
protecting and even expanding. 
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Meanwhile, the party also became increasingly riven by debates about the adoption of a more 
radical populist and anti-immigrant agenda. While antipathy towards the EU provided a unifying 
policy theme, those who wanted the withdrawal from the EU to remain the party’s primary focus 
clashed with those pushing for the party to give greater policy focus to issues related to Islam, 
immigration, and multiculturalism. These clashes would intensify in 2014 when Raheem 
Kassam, editor-in-chief of the right-wing news outlet Brietbart London, was hired as a senior 
advisor to Nigel Farage, further unsettling those who wanted to retain withdrawal from the EU as 
UKIP’s primary focus. Some prominent party figures, including deputy leader Suzanne Evans, 
openly expressed concern that Kassam was pushing Farage, and therefore the party, towards a 
radical right agenda as well as encouraging increasingly personal attacks against Farage’s rivals, 
both in and outside the party (Mason 2015). 
 
By this stage however such tension had arguably become inherent to the party: inscribed in the 
political logics shaping UKIP’s strategy. Electoral success, and therefore a greater role in 
shaping debates around the EU, required an expanded policy platform to attract and capitalize on 
greater support. At the same time, emphasising UKIP’s expanded policy positions risked 
highlighting fault lines within the support base that could be exploited by their opponents.  
 
In order to retain a modicum of control over the party, UKIP’s leaders continued to foreground 
the issue of the EU while deflecting critical examinations of their own ideological and political 
disunity with attacks on their main political competitors. This balancing act brought the party 
notable success, at least in the short term – generating a sense of considerable momentum among 
party activists and supporters and alarm among their political opponents. In 2014 there was 
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UKIP’s historic win in the EP elections. This was followed by two defections from Conservative 
Party MPs, Douglas Carswell and Mike Reckless, who won successive by-elections and helped 
to further expand UKIP’s professional political organisation. After standing candidates in four 
separate national elections for seats in Westminster, and failing each time, UKIP had two seats 
and expected to take more. With a national profile, expanded issue base, and voters willing to 
support them in both the North and South, UKIP was at the height of its influence in the lead-up 
to the 2015 general election. Rumours and polling data hinted at a hung parliament, with the 
prospect of a coalition government between a further handful of UKIP MPs and the Conservative 
Party seemingly a realistic prospect (Neather 2015).  
 
As such, with tensions between UKIP’s various factions and local branches simmering just 
beneath the surface, UKIP, arguably aided by heightened media and public interest in the so-
called ‘refugee crisis’ that reached a peak in 2015 (Poushter 2016), nonetheless played a major 
role in shaping the political debate in the run-up to the 2015 general election. The Labour Party, 
wary of the threat to its seats in northern England, placed uncharacteristic emphasis on promises 
to control immigration (Helm 2015). Yet it was the Conservative Party’s response to the 
perceived UKIP threat that would have the most dramatic effects. UKIP, acting more like a 
pressure-group while under the control of Lord Pearson, had failed just a few years earlier to 
extract the promise of an EU referendum from David Cameron. However, in 2015, with the 
burgeoning electoral organization of a serious political party, UKIP was a key player in 
pressuring Cameron to pledge a nation-wide referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. 
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Despite winning more than twelve percent (3.9 million) of votes cast that year, the UK’s first-
past-the-post voting system left UKIP with just one MP, Douglas Carswell – a bitter pill when 
the Liberal Democrats achieved eight seats with less than eight percent of the vote and the 
Scottish National Party fifty-six seats with less than five percent of the vote (Electoral 
Commission 2015). Despite UKIP achieving close second place losses behind Conservative and 
Labour Party rivals in more than ninety constituencies, UKIP was, by many traditional 
definitions, still a minor political party, with just one MP and control of just one local council. 
Yet 2015 was also a success for UKIP – certainly as a movement. They had shaped the debate, 
securing a campaign promise on their central political cause. They had followed an 
unconventional path to an unconventional success, but had nevertheless helped to generate 
enough anti-EU pressure to persuade the now-ruling Conservative Party to take one of the 
biggest gambles in recent British history. 
 
UKIP during the EU referendum: The shift into movement politics 
 
As we have argued, in its early years UKIP closely resembled what Kitschelt describes as a 
movement party, gradually becoming more like a full-fledged political party as they sought to 
build and sustain public support and exercise policy influence. UKIP’s strategies during the 
referendum, however, shifted again and became more similar to those of a political or social 
movement (see Diani 1992). UKIP’s key organisers, and eventually the party’s very identity, 
were subsumed into a more pluralistic network of groups with a shared ambition for UK 
withdrawal from the EU. While UKIP formally remained a distinct political party, and UKIP 
supporters were key activists in the Leave campaign, the group’s tactics changed significantly 
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during the referendum. The ideological and organisational conflicts that UKIP’s leaders had 
struggled to control during the lead up to the 2015 election, persisted and threatened to collapse 
the fragile sense of party unity engendered by their limited successes. However, the singular and 
imminent goal of the larger Leave movement provided its own political infrastructure and 
allowed UKIP’s leaders and supporters greater latitude for containing their differences than did 
the more multifaceted demands of operating as a political party.  
 
The potential for internal division was present from the outset as UKIP’s key figures aligned 
themselves with three different campaigns for leaving the EU. While Nigel Farage, along with 
Conservative, Labour, and Northern Irish DUP Eurosceptic MPs, founded Grassroots Out (GO!) 
(Harris 2016), Arron Banks, a major UKIP donor, founded Leave.EU in the summer of 20152 
(BBC 2015), and finally, Vote Leave was launched in October 2015 by Conservative Party 
activists with the support of UKIP’s only MP, Douglas Carswell and UKIP’s deputy chair, 
Suzanne Evans (Carswell 2015). The rivalries between these Leave-supporting groups echoed 
many of the differences that had divided UKIP in the past. Grassroots Out and Leave.EU 
advocated for a campaign more overtly focused on immigration and cultural values, while Vote 
Leave claimed to focus more on economic arguments against EU membership (Sparrow 2016). 
Though Vote Leave did, in April 2016, win the Electoral Commission mandate to officially 
represent the leave campaign, the other groups did not disappear, nor did the ideas that they 
represented. However, these differences did not in practice stop activists from the various 
campaigns collaborating with one another. Where similar conflicts had stymied UKIP’s growth 
                                                 
2  Leave.EU was originally called Vote Know, but changed when the referendum wording ‘Leave/Remain’ 
was chosen over ‘Yes/No’ (BBC 2015).  
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as a party, as part of the Leave movement, with its clearly defined common purpose, they were 
absorbed more successfully. 
 
This dynamic was apparent among local UKIP activists. In early June 2016, two middle-aged 
women, Nicole3 and Wendy, distributed Vote Leave leaflets as part of a large group of UKIP 
supporters in the Sheffield city centre. Both were well versed in the Vote Leave literature’s 
talking points, but they had also donned lime green, high vis jackets that loudly declared 
‘Grassroots OUT!’. When asked about this discrepancy, Nicole said she and Wendy, had 
supported ‘Nigel’s group’, and while they used and largely agreed with the Vote Leave 
materials, they still thought GO! had a more persuasive message. Like Grassroots Out, Nicole 
and Wendy frequently framed their arguments against the EU around immigration, despite the 
fact this was not a focus of the Vote Leave literature they distributed. Late in the afternoon, 
Wendy struck up a conversation with a younger woman who looked around furtively before 
saying in a confessional tone, ‘I don’t want to sound racist…’ Wendy interrupted her 
emphatically, ‘You’re not racist!’ The woman continued, ‘But if Turkey get in, we’re all dead. 
Because we’ll be a Muslim country.’ Wendy nodded enthusiastically as the woman spoke and 
told her that ‘control’ over borders and immigration would be returned to the UK outside the 
European Union. While such issues were not a focus of the Vote Leave literature they handed 
out, Nicole and Wendy felt free to frame their appeals to voters around issues about which they 
were obviously more personally passionate. 
 
                                                 
3  All names used in this chapter in the descriptions of primary data are pseudonyms. 
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Some of UKIP’s supporters went even further off script in attempts to persuade people to vote 
Leave, even if it meant endorsing views antithetical to their general political positions as UKIP 
members. For example, at another UKIP-organized campaign event in South Yorkshire, one 
man, Dean, brought a pamphlet that a local branch of the Communist Party had delivered 
throughout his neighbourhood, setting out the left-wing arguments to vote Leave. Despite 
agreeing with little of what the pamphlet said, apart from the headline message of voting Leave, 
Dean had committed its key points to memory and attempted to use them when speaking to 
people he thought may have a more leftist political worldview. 
 
The most striking example of how participation in the wider Leave movement shaped UKIP’s 
own strategy was the party’s own branding policy during the referendum campaign. UKIP-
organized Leave events mainly made use of official Vote Leave literature, with GO! and 
Leave.EU materials used less frequently Furthermore, in March 2016 UKIP leaders advised all 
local branches to avoid wearing, using, or even speaking about UKIP’s name or logo when 
campaigning on the EU referendum for fear of tainting Vote Leave and the other groups with any 
stigma associated with UKIP (Bennett 2016). These orders were not uncontroversial. Many 
UKIP activists were reluctant at first to relegate their political affiliation in favour of the 
movement campaign against the EU. Over time, however, some UKIP supporters began to think 
differently. Andrew, a late-middle-age man on the board of a local UKIP branch in Doncaster, 
said he had initially disagreed with the branding decision. He was proud to be a member of UKIP 
and saw no need to hide that fact. However, as the referendum campaign progressed, he accepted 
the ‘wisdom’ of this tactic. Fewer people were shouting at him or shutting doors in his face, 
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leading him to marvel at how much more positively people responded to the Vote Leave name as 
compared with that of UKIP.  
 
Where UKIP, alone, had only ever been able to persuade four million or so voters to back their 
cause, as part of the Leave movement, UKIP was a central player in a campaign that gained the 
support of more than four times that number. UKIP’s abdication of its political autonomy, 
identity, name, and logo in favour of the wider Leave-supporting movement had contributed to 
one of the biggest political upsets in a generation. Few people were more surprised by the Vote 
Leave’s success than UKIP’s own activists. It was a shock for which they and their party were 
thoroughly unprepared.  
 
The price of success: UKIP fractures after the ‘Brexit’ vote 
 
It took a while for the shock and disbelief among UKIP’s supporters in South Yorkshire to fade. 
It was replaced, at first, by optimistic determination. UKIP, they thought, was in a prime 
position. The party’s supporters had played a crucial role in providing the opportunity for more 
than 17 million people to vote to leave the EU. Local activists and branch leaders were 
determined to turn every one of them into a UKIP voter. Not only did this prove to be unrealistic, 
but UKIP was soon struggling to simply hold onto the base of support it had developed in the 
years leading up to the referendum. Neither did UKIP’s success erase the discord within its 
ranks. Indeed, it is in the fallout from this apparent victory that competing interests, aspirations 
and interpretations of success are laid particularly bare. No longer subsumed under the Leave 
movement, UKIP was once again a small political party divided amongst itself, but now without 
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its unifying purpose.  
 
When Farage announced his intention to resign as UKIP’s leader less than two weeks after the 
referendum, the reaction among the party faithful was mixed. Despite the barely disguised 
tensions within the national leadership, Farage was still considered by many to have acted as a 
unifying force for the party and he was generally popular among grassroots members of every 
stripe. However, a change in party leadership was seen, at first, as an opportunity to successfully 
refresh the party’s message and prepare their organisational infrastructure for the new political 
landscape wrought by the referendum. The desire for a new message and updated party 
structures were common refrains as the campaign for UKIP’s next leader began. Activists were 
aware that outsiders in the media and other parties expected UKIP to vanish now that its 
founding goal had been achieved. They were desperate to prove them wrong and demonstrate 
they were, as one long-time activist put it, ‘a real political party… not a one trick pony’.  
 
Defining UKIP’s post-referendum purpose would, however, turn out to be more challenging than 
most activists had imagined. As we now discuss, Leaders and supporters alike were divided. 
Discussions of UKIP’s new political focus, beyond the EU, were highly contentious, as were 
deliberations over the level of significance the ongoing Brexit negotiations should play in future 
UKIP policy and campaigning. As UKIP’s leaders and members struggled to resolve these 
disputes, it became clear that UKIP had become a vehicle for two different movements: a 
straightforward Eurosceptic movement and a radical right, anti-Islam movement. Following the 
referendum and the loss of the unifying forces of both the EU and Farage’s leadership, the 
precarious alliance between these factions quickly unravelled. Their competing visions of 
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UKIP’s future would dominate the party for at least the next fifteen months, shaping not one but 
three leadership elections as the party lurched through a series of public relations disasters and 
electoral failures. 
 
During the first of these leadership elections the eventual winner, Diane James, sought to address 
the issue of UKIP’s future political focus by proposing a consultation with the party’s members. 
James’ proposal deflected potential conflict and helped catapult her, however briefly, to the top 
role in UKIP. These conflicts could not be held at bay for long, however, as UKIP’s supporters 
began clamouring for a cohesive new party platform, the basis of which remained unclear. James 
resigned just eighteen days after being elected leader, citing concerns that she did not have 
‘sufficient authority’ or ‘the full support of all my MEP colleagues and party officers’ 
(Wilkinson 2016). Her departure was swiftly followed by a physical altercation between two 
UKIP MEPs that left one popular candidate for James’ successor briefly hospitalized. UKIP’s 
more EU-focused leaders, including Douglas Carswell and Suzanne Evans, both former 
Conservative Party politicians, advocated restoring focus and order within the party by 
prioritising the government’s negotiations with the EU, positioning themselves, and by extension 
UKIP, as the stewards of Brexit. This position, reminiscent of UKIP’s earlier behaviour as a 
single-issue pressure group, was swiftly challenged by other leaders and party members who 
believed UKIP should capitalise on its role in the referendum victory by expanding, not 
narrowing, its political aims.  
 
When a new leadership race was called following James’ resignation, Raheem Kassam, former 
advisor to Nigel Farage, became a contentious candidate both inside and outside the party when 
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he announced his intention to run for leader under the Donald Trump-inspired slogan ‘Make 
UKIP Great Again’ (Mason 2016). His rivals in the leadership race raised concerns that moves 
such as Kassam’s verbal attacks on Muslim schools and call for a national referendum on 
Muslim women’s clothing would lead the party toward the far right (Merrick 2016); part of 
wider concerns about the increasing closeness between Kassam, UKIP, and Breitbart 
(Kirchgaessner and Hopkins 2017). While anxieties about the supposed threats from Islam had 
begun to appear in UKIP’s longlist of political concerns in 2010, it was never a central point of 
organization or agreement across the party. Yet this shift clearly resonated with some elements 
of UKIP’s grassroots. Certainly, Breitbart was often referenced by UKIP supporters in South 
Yorkshire, with some citing discussions on the website’s comment section as a major influence 
in their decision to join UKIP. Although Kassam withdrew from the leadership race, debates 
over the adoption of anti-Islam positions and the potential for UKIP to lurch toward the right 
continued as long-time UKIP organiser Paul Nuttall, positioning himself as the party unity 
candidate, was elected leader in November 2016.  
 
Nuttall’s spell as leader began poorly and never really improved. He suffered an embarrassing 
by-election defeat in a pro-Brexit Stoke-on-Trent constituency in February 2017. That same 
month, nearly half of UKIP’s MEPs were reported to be under investigation by EU financial 
regulators for misuse of EU funding to support national level political campaigning, giving 
credence to rumours that had previously been a source of resentment among the party’s 
grassroots members (Rankin 2017). Less than two months later, in April 2017, UKIP lost 145 
local council seats. Fending off calls for his resignation, Nuttall debuted a controversial 
‘Integration Agenda’ in April 2017 that proposed, among other things, burqa bans, annual and 
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compulsory genital mutilation exams, and a moratorium on Muslim faith schools (UKIP 2017). 
While UKIP supporters who favoured a more radical policy platform welcomed the 
announcement, others, including Tariq Mahmood, one of the party’s few, high-profile Muslims 
members, denounced the agenda as too extreme, setting off a wave of resignations among senior 
party figures (Maguire 2017; Hope 2017).  
 
The divide between UKIP’s more EU-focused members and the anti-Islam faction was soon 
further compounded. After UKIP was resoundingly defeated in the June 2017 snap general 
election, returning its worst national election performance since 2001, Johnathan Arnott, a UKIP 
MEP was among those who criticised UKIP’s recent ‘anti-Islam messages’ (Heffer 2017). Paul 
Nuttall resigned as UKIP leader, yet there remained support within the party for his ‘Integration 
Agenda’; support that Anne Marie Waters sought to expand and deepen as she looked to replace 
Nuttall as leader. Breaking with UKIP’s history of seeking to clearly distinguish itself from the 
far right, Waters, the co-founder of anti-Islam social movement Pegida UK and chair of Sharia 
Watch, controversially welcomed support from both the BNP and activists affiliated with the 
anti-Muslim English Defence League. She was the first UKIP leadership candidate to openly 
propose rebuilding their political platform primarily around anti-Islam positions rather than 
opposition to UK membership of the EU, prompting former UKIP leaders, including Farage and 
Nuttall, to caution that such a myopic focus on Islam would render UKIP unelectable 
(Bloodworth 2017).  
 
Waters was narrowly defeated by Henry Bolton, a former Army captain, police officer, and 
Liberal Democrat, who had warned during the campaign that UKIP could become the ‘UK Nazi 
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Party’ should they choose the wrong candidate to replace Nuttall (Walker 2017). Bolton, who 
had campaigned on a platform that appealed to the party’s more moderate Eurosceptic members, 
used his acceptance speech to declare, ‘Brexit is our core task’ (Mance 2017). Waters promptly 
left UKIP, apparently with the intention of forming a new party. Meanwhile, rumours continue to 




UKIP’s journey is often told like a political Cinderella story. The UKIP of this fairy-tale was 
once a small, single-minded, largely unsuccessful party, whose obsession with the EU was easily 
mocked and dismissed. Until it suddenly burst upon the scene as a force in British politics, with a 
base of voters pulled from both the traditional right and left of the political spectrum, and helped 
to create one of the biggest political upsets in British history. As we have shown here, UKIP’s 
journey was not nearly so simple. Persistently torn between the strategic logics of a single-issue 
movement and a fully-fledged political party, even at the moment of what arguably comprised its 
greatest triumph, UKIP was riven with discordant understandings of the party’s fundamental 
purpose.  
 
UKIP was founded as a political party, yet operated for much of its history without strong 
organizational infrastructure or a broad policy platform. While these apparent deficiencies as a 
political party often inhibited UKIP’s growth and its ability to achieve electoral success, its 
ideological ambiguity also created opportunities for the party to draw support from diverse 
sections of British society, in turn enabling it to generate far greater policy pressure on both the 
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Conservative and Labour parties. In doing so, however, the party itself became increasingly 
fractured, a process exacerbated by the failure of the party leadership to ever fully incorporate 
new members and supporters within the party’s ideological and organisational structures .  
 
By 2015, UKIP had become a vehicle for at least two distinct movements, each with their own 
understandings of success, pulling the party in different, often contradictory directions. For 
UKIP’s more straightforward Eurosceptics, often drawn from primarily Conservative-dominated 
regions of southern England, success entailed removing the UK from the EU by any means 
necessary, even if it meant sacrificing UKIP’s political autonomy and survival. For this faction, 
elections were a means of raising the profile of their criticisms of EU membership and pressuring 
political competitors to adopt positions more hostile to the EU. They were wary of association 
with groups perceived as more politically extreme and of policies that might distract from the 
European issue.  For supporters of UKIP’s more radical and anti-Islam faction, the EU was also 
important, but was far from their sole political focus. Members of this faction aspired to make 
UKIP a competitive political party in order to advocate more wide-sweeping reforms to UK 
immigration law and a refocusing of policy priorities onto the supposed threats posed to the UK 
by Islam and Muslims. United by little more than their common antipathy to the EU, these 
factions within UKIP were tenuously united while the EU remained a central focus of the party’s 
platform. Tensions between them were largely set aside as attention centred on the imminent 
cause of achieving victory in the 2016 referendum. In the wake of the Leave movement’s 
victory, however, these divisions soon re-surfaced and the delicate balance between diverse 
interests and strategic logics unravelled.  
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Examining UKIP as a movement party can help us articulate a more complicated and less linear 
understanding of UKIP’s history: one that can help reveal the possibilities and liabilities facing 
movement parties on the right. As we have sought to demonstrate, of particular salience in this 
regard are issues about how the hybrid nature of movement parties can fuel and, at least 
temporarily, accommodate diverse interpretations of success and, related to this, the way 
movement parties can become vehicles for the interests of more than one movement, sometimes 
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